The Consociational Democracy Model in Conflict Management in the Case of Abkhazia

Abstract

Governing an ethnically and politically divided society is considered a difficult challenge in modern political science, as formal institutions often fail to ensure stability. The model of consociational democracy, as conceived by Arend Leifhardt, considers the institutional distribution of power in divided societies as a way to create stability.

The Abkhazian conflict of the 1990s is an example where the design of political institutions, despite the use of ethnic quotas, failed to ensure stability due to a lack of trust and the influence of external actors. The study showed that the principles of consociational democracy formally existed. Due to the lack of cooperation among elites and the intensification of ethnic competition in the governance process, institutional mechanisms were unable to de-escalate the conflict. Comparative analysis has revealed that integrative approaches, based on cooperation between groups and the involvement of the wider community, create more effective conditions for conflict management.

The case of Abkhazia clearly shows that the success of the consociational model depends not only on institutional mechanisms but also on socio-political preconditions, the degree of trust, and the influence of external actors. As a result, the creation of formal institutions alone is not sufficient for stable and sustainable political coexistence, and conflict management is possible only when political, ethnic, and geopolitical factors are jointly controlled.