Systematic Analysis of Audit Mechanisms for Corruption Prevention and Challenges in the Georgian Business Sector
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.52340/gbsab.2026.59.07Keywords:
Corruption prevention, Internal audit, Corporate governance, Transaction costs, Georgian business sector, COSO frameworkAbstract
- Research Overview & Theoretical Foundations
This summary synthesizes the key insights of the study evaluating the structural maturity and operational efficacy of audit mechanisms in mitigating corporate corruption within Georgia's private sector. Grounded in institutional economics, the article integrates Agency Theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), Rent-Seeking Theory (Krueger, 1974), and Collective Action Models (Rothstein, 2011). It highlights how corruption operates as a market failure that inflates transaction costs, distorts fair market competition, and deters Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).
Klitgaard's Anti-Corruption Formula & Digital Governance:
Applying C = M + D - A (Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion − Accountability), the study demonstrates that robust internal audit systems paired with digital accounting technology (Sologashvili & Udesiani, 2026) significantly maximize Accountability (A) while constraining discretionary power (D), fostering smart corporate governance.
- Economic Impact & Structural Challenges in Georgia
In the Georgian business environment, corruption manifests primarily through informal network influences, transactional fraud, and weaknesses in compliance governance. Transaction cost economics reveals two primary drivers of cost inflation:
Search & Bargaining Costs: Resources diverted to identify informal decision-makers and negotiate undisclosed commissions, replacing productive R&D investment.
Enforcement Risks: Lack of legal recourse for informal agreements, forcing firms to absorb high counterparty default and extortion risks.
- Strategic Recommendations for the Business Sector
To transition from superficial compliance to risk-based, resilient internal controls, the paper formulates five actionable strategies supported by recent empirical findings (Sologashvili & Udesiani, 2017, 2021, 2021b):
- Governance Independence: Restructure internal audit reporting lines directly to independent Audit Committees rather than executive management (CEOs).
- COSO & ISO 37001 Implementation: Embed the 5-component COSO Control Framework and adopt ISO 37001 Anti-Bribery Management Systems.
- Digitalization & Continuous Auditing: Leverage Big Data analytics and automated accounting platforms to detect transaction anomalies in real time.
- Whistleblower Protection: Establish secure, anonymized digital reporting channels to encourage structural transparency.
- Audit Quality Control: Enforce rigorous post-audit recommendation tracking and mandatory quality assurance reviews
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