INDEPENDENCE OF BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISION AT THE PRESENT STAGE
Keywords:banking regulation, banking supervision, independence concept, banking activity, central bank
Regulators and supervisors are responsible for ensuring the soundness of banks and other financial institutions, as well as the stability of the financial system as a whole. Experts and analysts are increasingly recognizing the need to protect banking sector regulators as much as possible from political pressure in order to avoid, if possible, the emergence of financial crises and a belated response to them. However, the paucity of studies that systematically reveal the reasons for the desirability or necessity of independence of financial sector regulators and the best ways to achieve it is surprising. In order to ensure the independence of financial sector regulation, it is necessary to focus on four aspects of independence: regulatory independence, supervisory independence, institutional independence, budgetary independence. The article analyzes the reasons why regulators and supervisors of the banking sector need to achieve a high degree of independence in order to properly perform their duties; It has also been established that the mere presence of regulatory and supervisory functions in the central bank does not automatically ensure their independence. There are needed certain mechanisms not only to guarantee the independence of the central bank, but also to guarantee the operational autonomy of the supervisor and the impartiality of the supervisory function within the central bank.
გელიტაშვილი გ., ყურაშვილი გ., ჭელიძე მ., 2023. საბანკო რეგულირების და ზედამხედველობის თანამედროვე ასპექტები. საერთაშორისო მულტიდისციპ-ლინარული სამეცნიერო კონფერენცია „თანამედროვე მსოფლიო ახალი გამოწვევების წინაშე“. ლარნაკა, კვიპროსი.
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