Перспективы разрешения приднестровского конфликта

Аннотация

The current stage of resolving the Transnistrian problem should be counted from 2019, when the rounds of negotiations in the «5 + 2» format ceased. This is despite the fact that I. Dodon and V. Krasnoselsky held several personal meetings (in particular, in October 2019 and July 2020), and discussed the issues of ending the criminal prosecution of the left-bank leaders and simplifying the free movement of people and goods across the administrative intra-Moldovan border with the Transnistrian region. At the insistence of the legitimate authorities of Moldova, negotiations with the separatist structures of Transnistria and the negotiations scheduled for October 2021 in Sweden did not take place. With the advent of M. Sandu to the post of President, the new Moldovan leader made a number of necessary tough statements addressed to Transnistria. In particular, she noted that she was not going to meet with the leader of the Left Bank V. Krasnoselsky, as her predecessors in office had done, despite the latter’s attempts to «force» the Moldovan authorities to enter into a negotiation process.

After the Russian Federation’s attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Left Bank leadership made many efforts to emphasize its «neutrality», despite the presence of the OGRF in the region. The leader of the separatists V. Krasnoselsky has repeatedly denied statements by the Ukrainian authorities about the «aggressive intentions» of Transnistria towards Ukraine, information that the region’s army was put on combat alert, that the Vinnitsa airport was fired upon from the territory of Transnistria, etc. [ Krasnoselsky’s behavior is explained by the fact that if Ukraine is really attacked from the territory of Transnistria, no matter by whom exactly, by the Left Bank «army» or by the OGRV troops, then the Ukrainian authorities will immediately deal a crushing blow to the region itself, and almost their first target, according to available data, will be the warehouses in Kolbasna, where approximately 20,000 tons of ammunition are located. That is, in the event of an explosion, not only Moldova, Ukraine, Romania and even Russia will be in the affected area to one degree or another, but almost certainly also countries such as Bulgaria, Greece, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and others. This means that from Transnistria, if such a scenario is realized, only memories will remain. Such a scenario is categorically disadvantageous to either the Tiraspol leadership or its Moscow curators, at least for now. Therefore, it will continue to make titanic efforts to stay on the sidelines, no matter how the war in Ukraine develops. Another goal of the separatists remains the resumption of the dead 5+2 format of meaningless negotiations on the settlement of the conflict. This format has long played its positive role, contributing to the internationalization of the conflict, and for many years has allowed the Russian Federation and Tiraspol to simply drag out time, not allowing the transition to key issues related to the status of the region within Moldova, preserving the most important role for the Russian Federation in resolving the conflict. At the same time, the separatists and the Kremlin constantly complain that if negotiations are not resumed, Moldova and Ukraine will inevitably lead to a war with the aim of eliminating Transnistria, which will be considered an attack on the Russian Federation, given the more than 250,000 residents of the region with Russian citizenship.