Syria after Bashar al-Assad. Geopolitical situation in the Middle East.

Abstract

        The relevance of the topic is due to many factors, the events of the "Arab Spring" that took place in North Africa and the Middle East since 2011 caused a systemic crisis in a number of countries in the region. The armed confrontation that initially arose between the official authorities of the SAR, led by President Bashar al-Assad and the camp of his opponents, attracted the close attention of a number of regional and international actors, which contributed to both the complication of the structure of the Syrian conflict and its internationalization. The evolution of the conflict occurred under the influence of many diverse factors, including the terrorist threat brought by radical Islamist groups, which then began to spread beyond Syria and further - the entire Arab world. On the night of December 8, 2024, the conflict in Syria reached its peak. The armed opposition occupied Damascus and declared the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime. A certain part of the national territory remains outside the control of Damascus, the socio-economic sphere has suffered greatly, and the painful problem of refugees has not been resolved. The conflict continues to have a negative impact on regional security. Such volatility poses a threat not only to Syria, but to the entire Near and Middle East.

        The collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime represents a turning point in Middle East politics. The rapid collapse of the Assad government, which had dominated Syrian and regional affairs for more than 50 years, was unthinkable for many, but it materialized in less than two weeks, as rebel forces swept across the country. This seismic event not only changes the internal dynamics of Syria, but also lays the foundation for a new stage in regional geopolitics. The nuances of Assad's fall, the rise of rebel coalitions, and the complex interplay of domestic and global players deserve closer examination to understand the challenges and opportunities in a post-Assad Syria.

         Bashar al-Assad’s government had long relied on a mix of repression, foreign support, and elite patronage to maintain power. By 2024, however, the cracks in that foundation had widened beyond repair. Several key factors contributed to the regime’s collapse: Years of international sanctions, widespread corruption, loss of access to oil-rich regions, and the widespread destruction wrought by the civil war had devastated Syria’s economy. Basic infrastructure, industry, and public services were in disrepair. The financial strain was felt acutely by the army, as soldiers were underpaid and poorly equipped. This economic deterioration undermined the morale of Assad’s supporters and destroyed the cohesion of the Syrian Arab Army.

         The fall of Bashar al-Assad has significantly reduced Russia’s influence in the Middle East and dealt a blow to its image. Along with Iran, Russia was the main sponsor of the Alawite regime in Syria, which was heavily dependent on Russian military, financial and political support. In return, Assad allowed Russia to maintain military bases on Syrian territory, including the naval facility in Tartus and the air base in Khmeimim. Russia’s successful military intervention to save Assad from collapse, conducted jointly with Iran between 2015 and 2017, significantly enhanced its reputation as a key power to be reckoned with in the Middle East.

            In addition to Russia’s loss of influence in Syria, the fall of the Assad regime will weaken its position vis-à-vis major players in the Middle East, such as Turkey, Israel and Iran. Turkey and Israel will no longer need to coordinate their military actions in Syria with Russia when targeting Kurdish groups or Iranian forces. As for Iran, general support for Assad has been one of the most significant factors driving closer ties between the two countries.

         Russia’s initial reaction to the overthrow of the Syrian regime was muted, reflecting both its surprise and its complete inability to influence the situation on the ground. Consequently, Russian propaganda worked to downplay events in Syria and reassure the public about the consequences of the uprising. At the same time, it tried to justify the Kremlin’s position by placing blame on the Assad regime and army, emphasizing that Russia’s current priority is the war in Ukraine, which explains its non-intervention in Syria.

          Among the major factors that led to the overthrow of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad were the decisions by Iran and Russia not to intervene again to prop him up. Tehran had long used Syria as a vector for projecting influence in the region, and mobilized significant resources and manpower to keep Assad in power when the Syrian civil war broke out in 2011. Moscow also saw its ties to Assad as a source of regional influence, and its intervention in Syria in 2015 was critical to Assad maintaining his stranglehold on power. But with Russia bogged down in Ukraine and Iran—and its allies like Hezbollah—severely weakened by the conflict with Israel after October 7, neither backer was prepared to bail out Assad again. While Syria’s trajectory remains highly uncertain, its post-Assad position is likely to be unfavorable to Russian and Iranian interests. The fall of the Assad regime is a major loss for Iran, which has not been so isolated or vulnerable in the region since the 1980-88 war with Iraq. Syria was Iran’s only close ally in the Middle East. It was the front line against Iran’s arch-enemy Israel and the linchpin of Tehran’s ability to project power in the Levant. For four decades, Syria was Iran’s main conduit for arms and equipment to Hezbollah in Lebanon, which has become the world’s most armed non-state actor.

          Israel's government has approved a plan to encourage settlement expansion in the occupied Golan Heights. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the move was necessary because a "new front" had opened on Israel's border with Syria after the fall of the Assad regime to an Islamist rebel alliance.

            Netanyahu has said he wants to double the population of the Golan Heights, which Israel captured in the 1967 Six-Day War and is considered illegally occupied under international law. Israeli troops entered the buffer zone separating the Golan Heights from Syria in the days after Assad's departure, saying the change in control to Damascus meant ceasefire agreements had "collapsed." Despite the move, Netanyahu said in a statement Sunday night that Israel was "not interested in a conflict with Syria."

           When Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan ordered troops to invade Syria in 2016, he justified the move by declaring, “We have no territorial claims on Syria. We just want to ensure that the rightful owners get their country back. We only invaded to end the rule of the tyrant Bashar al-Assad.” But even then, his radical words were backed by a hard-line policy of force. Ankara had supported armed rebels in Syria since day one and was determined to topple Syrian dictator Assad. Five years later, Turkey had established a permanent military presence in the rebel stronghold of Idlib in northern Syria.

             Today, Turkey is one of the biggest strategic winners in Syria’s political upheaval, while Russia and Iran can be considered among the biggest losers. Moscow has been a key ally of the Assad regime, while Tehran has provided support for militias. Turkey is close to al-Jawlani but does not control his forces; the Syrian National Army is more of an Ankara proxy. Until now, Turkey has been preoccupied mainly with problems near its border, in particular the persistent challenge posed by Kurdish fighters seeking autonomy.