Liberalism and World Order in Light of Geopolitical Philosophy

Abstract

        The issues of global political development and the formation of world order have long occupied the minds of international theorists and scientists who seek to understand and predict the future parameters of the world order. Turning points in the history of the United States, as well as in the history of other countries, often became a stimulus for active and deep reflection in the circles of the intellectual elite. The defining feature of the American expert and research environment was the focus on conceptualization and modeling of processes for the construction and organization of world order. The assertion of the US leadership in world politics and economics in the 20th century was associated with the development of ideas of global governance and the formation of a new world order. In this case, by order we will understand the structure and principles of organizing the system of international relations. The ideals of liberalism and democracy, as well as the idea of ​​exclusivity and predetermination of fate, are becoming an integral element of public consciousness. In a world that consisted of the belief in the legitimacy and legality of claims to dominant positions in the global governance of political, economic and social processes. Gradually, there was a synergy of liberal values, ideas of predetermination and leadership, which led to the embodiment of liberal ideology in foreign policy through measures and actions to spread the liberal democratic system throughout the world. In an international system dominated by the United States, it is not surprising that the actual and potential behavior of important second-tier states should be a source of ongoing interest. This article examines some of the ways in which China, Russia, India, and Brazil have responded to both U.S. hegemony and the changing nature of international society. It outlines some of the main analytical questions that arise when thinking about the foreign policy options of these countries and some of the main conceptual and theoretical categories within which these questions can usefully be framed. The first section examines the reasons for considering these countries as a group. The second section briefly reviews the two most common theoretical perspectives through which the systemic pressures on these countries are understood. The focus is on foreign policy options and understanding these options, rather than on assessing these countries' power resources or their economic trajectories. Thus, the central theme of twentieth-century international history has been the struggle of revisionist states for—equal rights—involving the redistribution of territory, the recognition of regional spheres of influence, and the pursuit of equality of status within formal and informal international institutions. No matter how much the currency of power or the rules of the power game have changed, this pattern of behavior remains an important element of global politics. Although the likelihood of military confrontation between major powers may have diminished, the issue of recognition has been exacerbated by the rise of the idea that the international community should seek to advance shared values ​​and goals rather than simply support coexistence and help minimize conflict. A third reason for considering these four countries together arises from the development of relations among them. China, Russia, India, Brazil: Common Factors and Distinctive Features. Why consider these countries in particular? One reason is that they all appear to possess a range of economic, military, and political power resources; some capacity to contribute to the construction of international order at the regional or global level; and some degree of internal cohesion and capacity for effective state action. There is something intuitively logical in the idea that regional predominance should constitute an important element of any claim to major power status. A state may position itself, or be seen by others, as representative of a particular region, which in turn may be defined geographically, linguistically, or in cultural or civilizational terms. This (contested) notion of representativeness was an important element in the debate over the permanent membership of Brazil and India on the Security Council. A state may see a region as a means of pooling power and promoting a regional coalition in support of its external negotiations (as in the case of Brazil and Mercosur in the face of the Free Trade Area of ​​the Americas). A state may seek to play an active and assertive role in regional crisis management both to buttress its own claims to regional authority and to ensure that it is not excluded from forms of crisis management undertaken by external actors (as in the case of China and North Korea). Finally, a state may be seen as a major power to the extent that it exercises a managerial or order-producing role in its region. This, in turn, may become an important element in its own relations with international institutions or with the United States. Yet the cases of Brazil, Russia, India, and China highlight the complexity of the regional-global nexus. In all four cases, foreign policy is significantly shaped by the regional context—through evolving regional balances of power (especially in South Asia and East Asia); through changing patterns of regional insecurity (especially in the form of new threat categories); and by increasingly dense patterns of social and economic regionalization. Regions also play a central role in historical self-understandings. Both Russia and India see themselves as natural leaders of a closed region in which outside interference is deeply unacceptable. Thus, the foundations of liberalism in the international order were laid in the period after the Second World War with the formation of international financial structures. Globalist vectors of American foreign policy began to play an increasingly decisive role in the development of this system. At the same time, the applied measures of economic coercion were directed increasingly at globalist goals. The end of the Cold War and the emergence of a unipolar system led to the process of realizing the corresponding ideals of Hamiltonianism and Wilsonianism, namely the creation of a world based on liberal rules. Despite the difference in the presentation of liberalism in the international order between the realist and liberal paradigms, representatives of both schools agree that it has come to an end. Liberal theory explains the failure of liberalism in the international order by the imbalance due to the accelerated integration of states deviating from liberal norms into the liberal system. In turn, realist theory argues that revisionist states view the spread of liberal values ​​as a threat to their existence. Accordingly, the international system has acquired a multipolar character as a result of the reactive impact of globalist intentions. Economic coercion became a frequently used tool in the Cold War policy of containment. The emergence of liberalism in the international order led to the increasing use of these measures by American administrations in the dissemination of globalist values. Today, their use is evident in the defense of Liberalism against confrontational states such as China and Russia. Wilsonian aspirations are deeply embedded in American foreign policy, and will be one of the determining factors in the world.