International Scientific Journal "The Caucasus and the World"
Journal “The Caucasus and the World” is the periodical, monthly published, summarized scientific edition of The Caucasian International Research Center for Geohistory and Geopolitics. The journal is registered at legal person of public law institute. Journal DOI: https://doi.org/10.52340/isj ISSN: 1987-7293 e-ISSN: 2720-832X
The Caucasian International Research Center for Geohistory and Geopolitics.
Some Words about the work of the Kingdom of Abkhazia
Recently, the book of the young Abkhaz historian Naala Kaslandzia, “Genesis and Formation of the Kingdom of Abkhazia” (Sokhumi, 2017), was published. The questions of the genesis and formation of the Kingdom of Abkhazia are considered in it based on the study and critical analysis of Georgian, Armenian, Arab and Byzantine sources and special scientific literature. The main goal of Abkhaz historiography is to create historiographical foundations and ideological base for the Abkhazian statehood. Therefore, Abkhaz researchers try to cover stages of the development of the “centuries-old Abkhazian statehood”. Studying the questions of the history of the Kingdom of Abkhazia plays an important part in this context. N. Kaslandzia’s approach to the issues under discussion is generally the same as that of other Abkhaz historians: the Kingdom of Abkhazia was a national Abkhaz state, the Catholicosate of Abkhazia - an Abkhaz ecclesiastical organization. Despite this, unlike other Abkhaz researchers, N. Kaslandzia widely uses Georgian historical sources and recognizes their importance for studying the history of the Kingdom of Abkhazia.
The History of Women's Wrestling in Central Asia During Ancient and Medieval Times
The history of women's wrestling in Central Asia during ancient and medieval times presents a compelling intersection of culture, gender roles, and social dynamics within nomadic societies. This article explores the significant yet often overlooked contributions of women to the sport of wrestling, tracing its roots back to matriarchal societies that existed between 40,000 and 3,000 BC. During this period, women held leadership roles within tribes, suggesting a societal structure that valued female authority and physical prowess. The Scythians and Sarmatians, nomadic groups prevalent in Central Asia, offer notable examples of societies where women participated equally in wrestling. Historical evidence indicates that these cultures embraced flexible gender roles, with women engaging in various physical activities traditionally reserved for men. The legendary warrior women known as Amazons, often linked to the Scythians, exemplified this phenomenon. Ancient texts, including those by Greek historians, document their remarkable skills in horseback riding, warfare, and archery, highlighting their formidable presence in battle. Despite the abundance of myths surrounding Amazons, modern scholarship increasingly recognizes the possibility of their historical existence. This article delves into the conflicting interpretations of the term "Amazon" and its implications for understanding gender in ancient warfare. By analyzing archaeological findings, such as graves of women buried with weapons, and historical accounts that reference female warriors, the research underscores the significant role of women in combat and the cultural importance of wrestling as a martial practice. Additionally, the article discusses the evolution of women's wrestling traditions among Turkic tribes and their survival into modern times. As contemporary Central Asia witnesses a revival of interest in traditional sports, including wrestling, this historical exploration serves to celebrate and acknowledge the enduring legacy of women in this martial art. Ultimately, the study aims to enrich our understanding of gender dynamics in historical Central Asian societies and contribute to broader discussions about women's roles in sports and cultural heritage. By situating women's wrestling within the larger context of Central Asian history, this article sheds light on the rich cultural tapestry that informs contemporary practices, encouraging a reevaluation of women's contributions to the sport and their representation in historical narratives.
The Papacy and the Struggle for Church Authority in the 12th–13th Centuries
The Catholic Church is currently the largest Christian denomination in the world in terms of followers. However, in modern times, its sphere of influence is significantly limited; the Pope can no longer be considered a serious political figure. In the Middle Ages, the Church was a significant socio-political figure in Europe. For a long time, the Popes claimed not only spiritual but also secular dominance in the region. At the beginning of the 13th century, the papacy came as close as possible to realizing these aspirations and created a unique situation in which a religious organization, being an independent participant in the international politics of the region, played a huge role in it. However, the reasons for which such a situation arose are rarely considered, as is the question of the stability of the papacy during its heyday. The main factor that allowed the Popes to compare with the most powerful secular rulers in terms of their influence on European politics was the presence of their own state with all the institutions necessary for it at that time. Since the 8th century, the head of the Catholic Church had in his possession a fairly vast territory by Italian standards, called the Papal States. To govern this territory, the church administration alone was not enough, and therefore secular feudalism developed in the Papal States and urban self-government was preserved. This naturally led to both an increase in the resources of the papacy and the emergence in its lands of a class of warriors and people capable of forming a city militia. Thanks to this, unlike the heads of other Christian denominations, the Pope could defend his political interests not only with the help of exhortations, but also by military means. Incidentally, the pontiffs used this opportunity not only for defense, but also for attack.
A VALUABLE BOOK ABOUT GEORGIAN-BALTIC RELATIONS
The collapse of the post-Soviet and post-socialist space entailed significant positive geopolitical changes. The Baltic States - Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, along with Georgia, having gone through a difficult path of development, were among the first to join the European family, the states and peoples of the Baltics demonstrated their unity and purposefulness to the world community, which was recognized by the European community. The importance of studying the history of Georgia's relations with the Baltic States is also connected with the fact that in the modern world the new states of the Baltic States have achieved certain successes in international relations and acquired their significance. A comprehensive study of the history of the Baltic States and their relations with Georgia in the context of general international politics from the Middle Ages to modern times seems relevant from both historical and political points of view. It was in the context of the above-mentioned importance of the Baltic States for Georgia that the Georgian historian Nikolai (Niko) Javakhishvili studied the stages of Georgia's relations with the Baltic States. As a result of his research, N. Javakhishvili published a book. The book by N. Javakhishvili gives an idea of ​​the author of the study as a trained, qualified specialist, capable of solving complex scientific problems. The author's architecture, logical and historical "pattern" of the declared scientific study in the book is determined by the wide potential of applicability due to its universality and variability. Nikolay (Niko) Javakhishvili is a representative of the new generation of Georgian historians. He is well known in scientific circles and the public not only in Georgia, but also abroad. Nikolay (Niko) Javakhishvili is a doctor of historical sciences, professor at the Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University. He is the author of many fundamental studies on the history of Georgia and the Caucasus. It should be noted that at a relatively young age he studied two auxiliary historical disciplines in monographs: “Georgian Phaleristics (Award Studies)” (Tbilisi, 1995) and “Georgian Bonistics” (Tbilisi, 1996). Thus, he initiated the study of these disciplines in Georgia. After the publication of these monographs, he put a lot of effort into studying the issues of Georgian phaleristics and Georgian bonistics and published essays “The Order of Queen Tamar” (Tbilisi, 1998) in Georgian and German, which are dedicated to the history of the German-Georgian military-political alliance during the First and Second World Wars; “Rewarding in Ancient Georgia” (Tbilisi, 1998), “Bonnies of the Democratic Republic of Georgia (1919-1921)” (Tbilisi, 1998). With his co-authorship, the catalogue “Money in Georgia” (Tbilisi, 2003) was published in Georgian and English. One of the important areas of scientific interest of N. Javakhishvili is the study of Georgian-Baltic relations. He has devoted more than 20 publications to the study of these issues. In 2011, the publishing house of Tbilisi State University published N. Javakhishvili's monograph "Essays on the History of Georgian-Baltic Relations" (in Georgian). The presentation of the book took place in 2013 in Latvia and the author's work received high praise. After this book was published in Georgian, publishing the book in foreign languages ​​became an issue. Finally, with the financial support of the Ministry of Culture of Latvia, this book was published in Latvian in Riga in 2015. Intensive work was also carried out on the Russian version, which was published under the auspices of the Latvian Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Latvian History of the University of Latvia. The very fact that such attention was paid to the book by the state and scientific circles of Latvia speaks of its significance. It is no coincidence that N. Javakhishvili was elected an honorary doctor of the Latvian Academy of Sciences in 2014. It should be noted that he is the youngest honorary doctor of the Latvian Academy of Sciences. The book opens with a preface by the then rector of Tbilisi State University, academician of the Georgian Academy of Sciences Vladimir Papava, where he warmly speaks of the book and its author. Then follows the author's introduction, where he briefly characterizes the Georgian-Baltic relations and expresses gratitude to everyone who contributed to the creation of the book. The monograph itself consists of three chapters, an impressive list of used sources and literature is attached, and the appendices include documents testifying to the Georgian-Baltic relations, reviews and reviews of the book by N. Javakhishvili, and an index of names is also attached, which is especially important for this kind of book. The book is the first attempt at a monographic study of the history of relations between Georgia and the Baltic countries – Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia from the 9th-10th centuries, when the first contacts, proven by coin circulation, were outlined, and up to the present day. These relations had and have a multifaceted character – trade and economic, cultural, military and political, etc. The first chapter – “Georgian-Baltic relations from the 9th to the end of the 18th centuries” tells about the beginning of Georgian-Baltic relations. Coins minted in Tbilisi in the 9th-10th centuries were found in the Baltic countries, which testifies to trade and economic ties between Georgia and the Baltics. The next fact from the history of Georgian-Baltic relations refers to the end of the 15th century. In 1494, the King of Kartli Constantine II (1478-1505) sent an ambassador, Hieromonk Kir-Nil, to Spain and Rome. He accompanied the Spanish ambassador who visited the Kingdom of Kartli. The ambassadors sailed across the Black Sea, went up the Dnieper River and through the possessions of Lithuania and Poland went to Spain. The importance of N. Javakhishvili's book for historians is difficult to overestimate. The book gives a clear and comprehensive idea of ​​the dynamics of the development of Georgia's relations with the Baltic countries, and allows us to evaluate the achievements of the past. We believe that N. Javakhishvili's book "Essays on the History of Georgian-Baltic Relations" can serve as a basis for further research into the rich Georgian-Baltic relations, and we are also confident that N. Javakhishvili's work will become a reference book for historians and specialists in international relations.
On the Coverage of Some Controversial Issues of Abkhazian Archaeology in Modern Russian Historiography
In connection with such a categorical judgment, it would not be superfluous to remind A. Skakov that any early state unification, any emerging ancient nationality is consolidated around a dominant element, absorbing ethnically related and unrelated neighboring tribal groups. Ethnic monolithicity at this stage of development is almost always relative. It rarely happens that a foreign, foreign-language and comparatively small, but consolidated and passionate group becomes dominant in this process, which subsequently itself dissolves into the local ethnic group, but creates state structures for it and even leaves its name after assimilation (for example, the Normans-Rus, Turkic Bulgars, Germans-Franks, etc.). But the Colchians are definitely not such a case. They were clearly the leading ethnic group in the Eastern Black Sea region both in terms of development and consolidation, and in terms of demographic indicators. And if A. Skakov tries to prove that the Kartvelian element was only one of many in the territory of the polyethnic Colchis in ancient times, then how can we explain the almost complete Kartvelization of the territory of present-day Western Georgia, and of Turkish Lazistan, in subsequent periods? When should it have happened? For us, however, it is more important that the author, despite all the reservations, judging by the context, still recognizes the Colchians as, if not the only, then still a very significant ethnic element in this region. At the same time, he does not deny that their possessions also included the center of present-day Abkhazia, the city of Dioscuria (in fact, according to all sources, Pitiunt was also included, but oh well). At the same time, he also admits that in the adjacent regions of Abkhazia and today's Krasnodar region lived, if not actually Colchian, then Kartvelian tribes of the Moskhs. To this we must add the Svans, who certainly always bordered the Zano-Colchians from the east, and therefore, the different versions of the highlands of eastern Abkhazia and the adjacent regions of Svaneti ("Djantukh-Larilar culture" according to A. Skakov) are most logically attributed to them. He simply "transfers" tribal groups of unclear origin (Koraks, Koly) outside the borders of Abkhazia. That is, on the territory of Abkhazia there is practically no room left for the ancestors of the Abkhaz ethnic group, with the exception of the upper reaches of the Bzyb or, more accurately, the Bzyb-Psou interfluve, and perhaps not completely (for example, it is noted that the Kartvelians-Moskhs live “on the border of Abkhazia and the Krasnodar Territory,” but it is unclear on which side of this border). If in the situation described above some Abkhaz-Adyghe tribe had wedged itself between the Colchians, Moskhs and Svans, then it would hardly have been able to avoid assimilation, and in a not very long time in historical terms (it should be remembered that the direct descendant of the Colchian language itself, Megrelian, is the easiest to study in this region, and in the competition of languages, especially unwritten ones, this is a very significant factor). But the author cannot give such examples and is forced to speak only hypothetically about the presence of the Abkhaz-Adyghe element even somewhere on the outskirts of Abkhazia. That is, all the tribes he noted on the territory of Abkhazia are either Kartvelian or of unclear origin, and the latter occupy only a very modest piece of today's western Abkhazia. As for the representatives of many dozens of multilingual tribes who came together at the beginning of the late antique period to trade in Dioscuria, who said that they all came from the territory of Colchis? Then a similar picture would have been not only in Phasis, but also in Gienos, Apsaros, Trebizond, etc., wherever there were Greek traders. Dioscuria, which lies outside the Phasis highway, was always oriented toward trade primarily with the north and after the destruction of Pitiunt, was obviously the closest convenient trading point for the entire Northwestern Caucasus. Moreover, this information already refers to another era, when the turbulent ethno-political processes in the Northwestern Caucasus at the turn of the century AD (the existence of which is also recognized by A. Skakov) undoubtedly increased the ethnic diversity of the region. This is our general impression from A. Skakov's publication. Summarizing the conclusions of the Russian scholar in a few words, we can highlight the following main findings of the author: The Colchian (and even more so the Colchian-Koban) culture, as well as the subsequent material culture of the Eastern Black Sea region, is not entirely homogeneous, on the basis of which it cannot be excluded (as, incidentally, it cannot be asserted) that its individual variants may belong to tribal groups ethnically different from the Colchians, including non-Kartvelian ones. The Colchians, however, owned not only the territory of Megrelia (the Inguri-Rioni interfluve), but also that of present-day Abkhazia, or at least its central regions, including Sukhumi. Later, at the beginning of the Common Era, the Colchians were significantly pushed back to the southeast, but they soon managed to partially restore the situation, firmly establishing themselves in the eastern part of present-day Abkhazia, and also annexing Apsilia and subjugating Abazgia. It is impossible to say anything with certainty about the borders of the latter, however, but even at the end of the ancient period the area of ​​common distribution of the Abkhazian (or considered as such) tribes, even including Apsilia integrated into the Kingdom of the Lazes, hardly went much further southeast than Dioscuria. In any case, it did not reach Inguri. In general, the concept of A. Skakov presented in the above article is closest to the compromise views that prevailed in Soviet times and more or less suited both sides. However, there were also discrepancies then: Abkhaz historians, while not denying in words the cultural, and perhaps even political, closeness of the population of Abkhazia (“Colchians in the broad sense”) with the “Colchians proper” (Mingrelians-Chans), nevertheless tried to present this population as an Abkhaz-speaking substrate, and the territory of Abkhazia, accordingly, as the original cradle of their own ethnic group exclusively. The question of the Abkhaz-Georgian ethnic borders of that era was usually ignored, although it was assumed that they roughly corresponded to the administrative borders of the Abkhaz ASSR (although, at times, it was hinted that the ancestors of the Abkhaz-Adyghe were the first settlers not only of the territory of present-day Abkhazia, but also of all of ancient Colchis, in any case, of the Eastern coast of the Black Sea for sure. Georgian scholars, on the contrary, believed that the ethnic area of ​​the “Colchians proper” included, in any case, a very significant part of present-day Abkhazia, although they also tried not to dwell on this delicate point. We leave it to the readers to judge which of these options is closer to the author’s concept. It is easy to see that the purpose of our comments was not so much to criticize individual provisions of the author (which would be difficult to do in full within the framework of one articles), but rather a statement of the fact that A. Skakov's concept, even if accepted in full, upon objective examination rather reinforces the traditional Georgian view of the problem than the Abkhazian one. The fact is that A. Skakov, to his credit, is a professional for whom professional ethics is obviously not an abstract concept and does not allow him (unlike his predecessor Yu. Voronov) to completely sacrifice objectivity for the sake of the situation.
Cultural and Educational Policy of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in Abkhazia
The article discusses the cultural and educational policy of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in Abkhazia. Based on a cyclic study of the Legal Acts of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, the press, archival documents, memories of statesmen and other historical sources of 1918-1921, the reforms carried out by the government of the First Republic in the field of education and culture are analyzed. The government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, right from the declaration of independence, on May 26, 1918, started reforms throughout Georgia, including Abkhazia: they laid the foundation for the formation of a modern educational system and a new type of educational relations, for the first time, all educational institutions were institutionally subordinated to the state, "nationalized" and regulated the educational process. They supported and financed the professional development of teachers, paid great attention to the educational rights of national minorities, especially Abkhazians, created several higher primary schools - in Sukhumi, Gagra, Ochamchire and Samurzakhano, and transformed the Sukhumi teacher's seminary into an educational institute with educational content. In Abkhazia, the first professional unions of teachers were formed at this time. At Tbilisi State University, for the first time in the history of the Abkhaz people, the foundation was laid for the scientific study and research of the Abkhaz language. As a result of the policy pursued by the government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia in 1918-1921, the first music and theater societies were formed in Abkhazia by professional cadres sent from Tbilisi, which laid the foundation for the institutional development of professional music and theater collectives in the future. In the conditions of democratic Georgia, the famous Abkhazian writer and public figure Dimitri Gulia, with the support of his friends from Tbilisi, was able to create the first Abkhazian-language newspaper, which was later canceled by the Bolshevik government.
CONQUEST OF THE WESTERN CAUCASUS AND ABKHAZIA BY RUSSIA
In the August 1859 one of the most important stages of Caucasian war was ended by the Russian conquest of North-East Caucasus (1763-1864). But the mountaineers of the Western Caucasus continued their fight against Russia - Adigen and Abazian tribes. During the conquest of the West Caucasus, the Russian command paid an extreme attention to the Abkhazian factor. It was obvious that till the time, Russia had only the seaside under his lead, they would never have any power on Abkhazia. Since the Autumn 1860 the Caucasian command had taken a new course of leading the war. The main way of conquesting a region was the military colonization. It has been decided to start settling the West Caucasus with the Cossack villages and move the local population to the Kubanian field or Turkey. Upcoming threat forced the West Caucasian mountaineers to ask for help the Turkey and West European countries. But the Europe and Turkey have disregarded the mountaineers tragedy. Realizing that they were not in the power of going against the Russian road of victory conquest, they knew that the mountaineers fate had been predicted. In the 1864 on the hills of Mzimta, in the highland of Gubaad (in Russian – Kbaada, now red glade) community Akhchipsu, the Caucasian war was officially announced to be over. After the conquest of the West Caucasus, Russia had no reason to maintain the existence of the autonomous Abkhazian principality any longer. In June 1864 the Abkhazian principality was abolished and the Russian governance has arrived. The eviction of most of the West Caucasus mountaineers to the Turkey was connected to the end of the Caucasian War, but the process had been started long before. According to the official records, during the years 1858-1864 470 000 people have been transferred to the Turkey and almost 90 000 from the Kuban and Lab. On the North-Eastern coast of the Black sea and in the mountains of West Caucasus there was almost no one left from the Adigenian or Abazinian population. The Russian Em­pire has gained a huge territory for colonization. Even only during 1861-1864 there were 111 Cossack villages established (85 000 people). Meanwhile the Russians who were leaving their provinces where settling on the same territory and also the Greeks and Armenians moving from Turkey, because these ones had to become the support of the Tsarism in this region. In 1866 the Reform has been made regarding the administrative system of the West Caucasus. A big region from the Kuban to the main Caucasian ridge, became part of the Kubanian Region and the North-Eastern coast of the Black sea became part of the Black sea Region. In this way Tsarism has achieved his aim – the West Caucasus had been taken under the lead of the Imperial administrative system.
The last outbreak of hostilities between Russian troops and the Adyghe occurred in 1878. The deportation of the remaining Adyghe to Turkey did not cease until 1910, sometimes several thousand people per year. In 1888, 3,421 people were expelled, in 1890 - 9,153 people, in 1895 - 3,999 people. On March 9, 1857 (seven years before the end of the Caucasian War), the government of the Sultan adopted a law on the resettlement of the highlanders of the North Caucasus to the territory of the Ottoman Empire, which promised that: anyone wishing to move to Turkey will be under the personal protection of the Sultan; the lands provided to the settlers are exempt from all taxes; everyone who moves to Thrace is exempt from military service for 6 years, and to Anatolia - for 12 years. In 1860, three years after the adoption of this law, the Administration for Muhajir (Emigrant) Affairs was established in the Ottoman Empire [Fasih Baderkhan. "The North Caucasian Diaspora in Turkey, Syria and Jordan (the second half of the 19th - first half of the 20th century)". Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2001. p. 25.]. However, as a modern Russian historian, one of the leading experts on Adyghe history, Professor Anzor Kushkhabiyev writes: "On the Ottoman coast of the Black Sea, the Circassian exiles found themselves in rather difficult conditions. Local authorities, not expecting the arrival of such a significant number of Circassians, did not have time to provide them with temporary housing and a minimum of food. The exiles were housed on the coast in tents, empty barracks, etc. Fearing the spread of epidemic diseases among the local population, the authorities created quarantine camps along the coast where the Circassian exiles had gathered. Epidemic diseases (typhus, smallpox), food shortages, and inability to adapt to new climatic conditions caused the death of a significant number of exiles. The Ottoman authorities took certain measures to assist the Circassian exiles. State funds were allocated for their needs; a campaign to collect donations was launched. However, despite these measures, the assistance received by the exiles was insufficient and did not always reach their destination. According to eyewitnesses, in 1863-1864 the number of Circassian exiles who died in the Ottoman Empire amounted to over 100,000 people. According to official data from the Ottoman government in 1867, the number of Circassian exiles in the Ottoman Empire (excluding those killed) was 595,000 people." Review of D. Syromyatnikov's article "War as a means of constructing a nation." A Circassian officer of the Turkish army, Nuri, who endured the hardships of emigration, later recalled: "... We were thrown like dogs into sailboats; suffocating, hungry, ragged, sick, we awaited death as the best for our fate, nothing was taken into account: neither extreme old age, nor illness, nor pregnancy! All the money that your (Russian) government allocated to support the settlers, it all went somewhere, but where? We didn't see them, we were treated like cattle, we were dumped on common beds by the hundreds, without distinguishing who was healthy, who was sick, and thrown out on the nearest Turkish shore. Many of us died, the rest were stuck wherever they could." Soon after, Generals Nuri Pasha and Yusuf Izzet Pasha, having formally resigned from the Ottoman army, took up the posts of commanders-in-chief of the armed forces of Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus, respectively. Many of the officers and soldiers under their command also expressed their willingness to remain in the Caucasus, having concluded military contracts with the aforementioned republics. Only after a note from the British command demanding strict compliance with the terms of the armistice were the new Istanbul authorities forced to give an unambiguous order to evacuate their units from the Caucasian territories they had occupied. At the end of November 1918, the forces led by Yusuf Izzet Pasha left the North Caucasus. Then in the spring of 1919, the Volunteer Army of General Anton Denikin entered the North Caucasus with fighting, and the government of the Mountain Republic was dissolved. In the autumn of the same year, after the victory of the 11th Red Army, members of the Mountain Government emigrated to Turkey and Europe. The first attempt at historical revenge, the implementation of the project of creating an independent Circassia, ended in failure. The project remained a project - for the time being, as many Circassians believed. Meanwhile, bad times for the "Circassian cause" unexpectedly came to Turkey as well.
SOME INFORMATION ON THE SOURCE SCIENCE OF THE AGRICULTURAL HISTORY OF THE TIMURID EMPIRE
This article analyzes some information about the source science of agricultural history of the Timurid Empire. Sources of farming during the time of Amir Temur and the Timurids are described in a fragmented and scattered state in various sources. These materials are important in understanding the factors that directly and indirectly affect the development of agriculture, policies in the field, irrigation systems, agriculture and its area expansion, taxes, land ownership, and the impact of agriculture on other industries. Archeological monuments, especially the sites and traces of gardens from the time of Amir Temur, the remains of fruits and trees, and household items provide information about the agricultural practices used during this period. The study of sources on the history of agriculture during the period of Amir Temur and the Timurids requires careful analysis and a careful approach to the interpretation of data. Also, the study of material and written sources of this period is important for historians and research scientists in studying the concepts of agriculture, agrarian relations and other fields during the period of Amir Temur and the Timurids. We sorted the materials and divided them into the group of material and written sources and covered our research on this basis.
On the History of the Emergence of the Theory of Information Society
Information is the only resource that does not decrease in the course of the evolution of human society, but constantly increases. Information has always existed. However, since the second half of the twentieth century, with the development of computing technology, communications and telecommunications, its role has increased significantly. The formation of an information society is taking place. All this contributes to the active study of information processes. The category of "information" began to be used in many sciences, both natural and humanitarian, allowed us to take a new look at the provisions of a particular theory. Currently, there are many theories formulated by sociologists, philosophers, economists and cultural scientists in an attempt to explain the state of modern society. Some believe that humanity has entered a new era, where the leading role belongs to knowledge, information and scientific progress. Others prefer to associate the current stage of social development with the previous ones, calling modern society post-industrial, post-capitalist, postmodern or post-modern, depending on the field of activity of the scientist and his affiliation with a particular philosophical movement. Despite the fact that all thinkers agree that the second half of the twentieth century is characterized by an unprecedented growth in information volumes and the intensification of information exchange, few substantiate the characteristic properties of the new era, limiting themselves to a superficial description of the causes and possible consequences. There are a number of classifications formed by different researchers at different times in an attempt to organize information theories that have the greatest sociological significance. At the same time, it is through their comprehension that knowledge of modern reality occurs and the opportunity opens up to predict the development of mass society in the coming years. This determines the relevance of the analysis of both the theories themselves with the identification of their common basis, and the most common types of classifications.
The Problem of Space and Time in Philosophy
The relationship between time and space is one of the main topics in philosophy, which studies the nature of reality, human perception and existence. This relationship involves various philosophical trends and schools of thought, and its discussion covers many aspects. In ancient philosophy, especially in Plato and Aristotle, space and time were considered the foundations of physical reality. Plato emphasized in his dialogues that the physical world is only a reflection of the ideal world of ideas, where time and space exist in the context of eternal forms. Aristotle, on the other hand, proposed a more “earthly” approach, viewing time as a measurement of changes associated with movement, and space as the context in which this movement occurs. With the advent of modern times, thinkers such as Descartes and Newton began to view time and space as absolute categories. Newton described space as a "receptacle" in which all events take place, and time as something universal and homogeneous. This created the basis for classical mechanics and played a decisive role in understanding physical reality. With the development of German idealism, especially in the works of Kant, there was a significant revaluation of time and space. Kant argued that space and time are not properties of things themselves, but forms of our perception. We cannot know things "as they are", but understand them only in the context of spatio-temporal categories. Thus, space and time become integral aspects of human perception, and not objective characteristics of the external world.
Philosophical Thinking and Gender Issues
The task of philosophy in the 21st century is to overcome antitheticality both in the answers to the "eternal" philosophical questions and in their formulation. The traditional relationship between the general and the individual, the individual and society, the possibility and reality, the project and its implementation, the new and the old, intuition and rationality, expression and aggressive means, male and female becomes in the newest philosophy, first of all, a gender theme, in relation to which a new style of philosophical thinking is formed. Gender studies influenced such philosophical schools as phenomenology, the logic of the development of its main ideas. Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, St. George, Heidegger focused the idea of ​​phenomenological research on bodily experience, meaning, significance, the language of expression or expressiveness itself. Various concepts of gender studies try to give an analytical study of subjectivity. Some of them are close to feminist issues, others are guided by the trends of the latest philosophy.
The concept of happiness in ancient philosophy
Happiness is a rather broad and complex concept in philosophy. The problem of the phenomenon of happiness attracted thinkers even in ancient times. Nowadays, the problem of happiness is very relevant. Modern people tend to delve deeper and deeper into their own "I" and look for answers to eternal questions, one of which is the problem of finding happiness. This article attempts to answer the question of what a good life is and what a person should strive for first and foremost. The possible reasons for a person's conscious or unconscious reproduction of the trajectory of his life path are analyzed, the movement along which can lead him to a happy life. Each of us at least once in our lives thought about happiness. The idea of ​​\u200b\u200bit and the ways to achieve it are different for everyone. For one, happiness is the achievement of the desired well-being, for another, it is the closeness and joy of meetings, the awareness of being needed and in demand, for a third, it is the fullness and meaningfulness of one's own life. Happiness is a certain ideal, realized in something specific. It is a good, the necessity of which is recognized by everyone. That is why a person consciously or unconsciously reproduces a peculiar trajectory of the path of life, the movement along which can lead him to his happy life. Depending on how he understands the purpose and meaning of his own life, his understanding of happiness occurs. The question of happiness is, first of all, a question about what a good life consists of and what a person should strive for first of all. As a philosophical category, happiness is presented in the works of philosophers of different periods of history. We are interested only in the ancient period.
Russia's War in Ukraine and Security Issues of the European Union
The integration process that began in Western European countries in the mid-20th century and subsequently spread to Southern, Eastern and Northern Europe had a significant impact on the further development of the countries of the region. The changes that took place during the second half of the 20th century were, to a certain extent, revolutionary in nature. They affected the socio-economic and political spheres and had far-reaching consequences for the system of international relations. The economic cooperation that underlies the integration process was eventually supplemented by coordination of actions in the sphere of foreign policy, security and defense, including military aspects. A number of internal and external factors influenced the development of these processes. On the one hand, the very logic of the development of the integration process required the expansion of cooperation areas to the area of ​​foreign policy to protect their economic interests, on the other hand, the aggravation of international contradictions, and as a consequence the emergence of a number of conflict zones in various regions raised the question of the formation of an effective security system. European countries believed that their geopolitical space was reliably protected and seemed not to expect an enemy, but with their policy they received a war of Russia against the Ukrainian state. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 marked the end of European security as a cooperative project. That project was based on the so-called Helsinki Decalogue, a declaration in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 that set out agreed principles of conduct between the West and the Soviet bloc. In the years and decades that followed, European security became more complex and expansive, especially after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Arms control agreements, institutional arrangements between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russia, and the agencies of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) gave an ever tighter structure to the security order. That order has collapsed. European security must now be rethought and rebuilt in what promises to be a long period of Russian hostility and obstructionism. In these circumstances, there is little reason to reform the OSCE so that it can continue to function in a sharply divided Europe. Nor is there much reason to formally abolish it: it could still serve as a forum in which the US and Europe could meet with Russia to discuss a range of issues. This could be valuable in the absence of other regular channels of communication. So it is important for the European Union today to preserve a single, independent Ukrainian state, for its own security.
Geopolitics of the Middle East and ASEAN in Contemporary Political Dynamics
The Middle East, stretching from Libya in the west to Iran in the east and from Turkey in the north to Yemen in the south, and Southeast Asia is a vast macro-region encompassing 11 continental and island territories: Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia and part of Bangladesh. has long been the focus of influential political figures throughout history. Its strategic location at the crossroads of trade routes has elevated its status as one of the most significant regions in the world. In the last century, the discovery of oil in the region and its subsequent dominance as a global energy source has further increased the region's importance. This article analyzes key geopolitical aspects and trends that shed light on the Geopolitics of the Middle East and ASEAN countries in contemporary political dynamics. The objective of this study is to analyze the role of the Middle East and Southeast Asian countries in global geopolitics and how they cope with challenges while capitalizing on opportunities in the international political dynamics in the era of globalization. As the world order undergoes significant changes, the countries of the Middle East and Southeast Asia face complex challenges such as geopolitical tensions, regional conflicts, major power interventions, and changing strategic alliances. However, they also have opportunities to strengthen their diplomatic and economic positions through international cooperation, investment, and active roles in multilateral organizations. Using a qualitative analytical approach, this study examines the foreign policies, diplomatic strategies, and international relations dynamics of these countries, including their role in organizations such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and their relations with major powers such as the United States, China, and Russia. The study uses a qualitative analytical approach with a literature review method. The data is obtained from secondary materials such as academic journals, books, policy reports and articles related to the geopolitical issues of the countries in the region. The results show that despite significant challenges, these countries have the potential to act as critical players in global geopolitics if they can optimize the available opportunities such as strengthening economic cooperation and diplomacy based on common interests.
Syria after Bashar al-Assad. Geopolitical situation in the Middle East.
The relevance of the topic is due to many factors, the events of the "Arab Spring" that took place in North Africa and the Middle East since 2011 caused a systemic crisis in a number of countries in the region. The armed confrontation that initially arose between the official authorities of the SAR, led by President Bashar al-Assad and the camp of his opponents, attracted the close attention of a number of regional and international actors, which contributed to both the complication of the structure of the Syrian conflict and its internationalization. The evolution of the conflict occurred under the influence of many diverse factors, including the terrorist threat brought by radical Islamist groups, which then began to spread beyond Syria and further - the entire Arab world. On the night of December 8, 2024, the conflict in Syria reached its peak. The armed opposition occupied Damascus and declared the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime. A certain part of the national territory remains outside the control of Damascus, the socio-economic sphere has suffered greatly, and the painful problem of refugees has not been resolved. The conflict continues to have a negative impact on regional security. Such volatility poses a threat not only to Syria, but to the entire Near and Middle East. The collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime represents a turning point in Middle East politics. The rapid collapse of the Assad government, which had dominated Syrian and regional affairs for more than 50 years, was unthinkable for many, but it materialized in less than two weeks, as rebel forces swept across the country. This seismic event not only changes the internal dynamics of Syria, but also lays the foundation for a new stage in regional geopolitics. The nuances of Assad's fall, the rise of rebel coalitions, and the complex interplay of domestic and global players deserve closer examination to understand the challenges and opportunities in a post-Assad Syria. Bashar al-Assad’s government had long relied on a mix of repression, foreign support, and elite patronage to maintain power. By 2024, however, the cracks in that foundation had widened beyond repair. Several key factors contributed to the regime’s collapse: Years of international sanctions, widespread corruption, loss of access to oil-rich regions, and the widespread destruction wrought by the civil war had devastated Syria’s economy. Basic infrastructure, industry, and public services were in disrepair. The financial strain was felt acutely by the army, as soldiers were underpaid and poorly equipped. This economic deterioration undermined the morale of Assad’s supporters and destroyed the cohesion of the Syrian Arab Army. The fall of Bashar al-Assad has significantly reduced Russia’s influence in the Middle East and dealt a blow to its image. Along with Iran, Russia was the main sponsor of the Alawite regime in Syria, which was heavily dependent on Russian military, financial and political support. In return, Assad allowed Russia to maintain military bases on Syrian territory, including the naval facility in Tartus and the air base in Khmeimim. Russia’s successful military intervention to save Assad from collapse, conducted jointly with Iran between 2015 and 2017, significantly enhanced its reputation as a key power to be reckoned with in the Middle East. In addition to Russia’s loss of influence in Syria, the fall of the Assad regime will weaken its position vis-à-vis major players in the Middle East, such as Turkey, Israel and Iran. Turkey and Israel will no longer need to coordinate their military actions in Syria with Russia when targeting Kurdish groups or Iranian forces. As for Iran, general support for Assad has been one of the most significant factors driving closer ties between the two countries. Russia’s initial reaction to the overthrow of the Syrian regime was muted, reflecting both its surprise and its complete inability to influence the situation on the ground. Consequently, Russian propaganda worked to downplay events in Syria and reassure the public about the consequences of the uprising. At the same time, it tried to justify the Kremlin’s position by placing blame on the Assad regime and army, emphasizing that Russia’s current priority is the war in Ukraine, which explains its non-intervention in Syria. Among the major factors that led to the overthrow of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad were the decisions by Iran and Russia not to intervene again to prop him up. Tehran had long used Syria as a vector for projecting influence in the region, and mobilized significant resources and manpower to keep Assad in power when the Syrian civil war broke out in 2011. Moscow also saw its ties to Assad as a source of regional influence, and its intervention in Syria in 2015 was critical to Assad maintaining his stranglehold on power. But with Russia bogged down in Ukraine and Iran—and its allies like Hezbollah—severely weakened by the conflict with Israel after October 7, neither backer was prepared to bail out Assad again. While Syria’s trajectory remains highly uncertain, its post-Assad position is likely to be unfavorable to Russian and Iranian interests. The fall of the Assad regime is a major loss for Iran, which has not been so isolated or vulnerable in the region since the 1980-88 war with Iraq. Syria was Iran’s only close ally in the Middle East. It was the front line against Iran’s arch-enemy Israel and the linchpin of Tehran’s ability to project power in the Levant. For four decades, Syria was Iran’s main conduit for arms and equipment to Hezbollah in Lebanon, which has become the world’s most armed non-state actor. Israel's government has approved a plan to encourage settlement expansion in the occupied Golan Heights. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the move was necessary because a "new front" had opened on Israel's border with Syria after the fall of the Assad regime to an Islamist rebel alliance. Netanyahu has said he wants to double the population of the Golan Heights, which Israel captured in the 1967 Six-Day War and is considered illegally occupied under international law. Israeli troops entered the buffer zone separating the Golan Heights from Syria in the days after Assad's departure, saying the change in control to Damascus meant ceasefire agreements had "collapsed." Despite the move, Netanyahu said in a statement Sunday night that Israel was "not interested in a conflict with Syria." When Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan ordered troops to invade Syria in 2016, he justified the move by declaring, “We have no territorial claims on Syria. We just want to ensure that the rightful owners get their country back. We only invaded to end the rule of the tyrant Bashar al-Assad.” But even then, his radical words were backed by a hard-line policy of force. Ankara had supported armed rebels in Syria since day one and was determined to topple Syrian dictator Assad. Five years later, Turkey had established a permanent military presence in the rebel stronghold of Idlib in northern Syria. Today, Turkey is one of the biggest strategic winners in Syria’s political upheaval, while Russia and Iran can be considered among the biggest losers. Moscow has been a key ally of the Assad regime, while Tehran has provided support for militias. Turkey is close to al-Jawlani but does not control his forces; the Syrian National Army is more of an Ankara proxy. Until now, Turkey has been preoccupied mainly with problems near its border, in particular the persistent challenge posed by Kurdish fighters seeking autonomy.
Geopolitics – A Threat to International Relations
We live in a world where geopolitics has become a universal term used in everyday life. Looking at world maps, politicians, experts, journalists, scientists and even ordinary Georgian peasants use it to explain the latest processes taking place in the country and in international relations, no matter how complex and multi-layered they may initially seem. Geopolitics has entered the mass consciousness of public opinion, resembling people’s views on the world order and national interests. Every new political crisis, be it domestic or international, revolution, regime change, international or regional conflict, intervention, hybrid war, or just war, business interests of transnational and multinational corporations, the establishment of oil and gas routes or fluctuations in world markets are explained through the prism of geopolitics. Citizens of the United States of America believe that America’s interests are best preserved if the country achieves its strategic goals in the Middle East, the Asia-Pacific region, the South Caucasus, Africa or Asia. The United States must be an advanced country that controls the rest of the world so that its own population lives better than anyone else, and so that people from all over the world come to the United States to earn money. And all this is because the leaders of the United States are the best geopoliticians in the world. Russia lags behind the West in all spheres of life, but does everything to survive as a Power. It managed to bomb Georgian cities and villages, destroy the Georgian population in order to occupy historical Georgian regions, Russian citizens approved of Russia’s policy towards Georgia with their silence, since it all came not from hatred of Georgia, but from Geopolitics. Georgia simply ended up where the West or the East needed to be, and proud Georgians console themselves by mocking them, like where were they when we wrote poetry!!! And, they blame it all on geopolitics! The actual occupation of Iraq, the overthrow and murder of Saddam Hussein or Muammar Gaddafi, the devastation of Asian and African countries is nothing other than His Majesty GEOPOLITICS. Military operations in Syria and the country’s efforts to join the war on terror, while the media continue to publish maps of battlefields, engaging their readers in discussions about the balance of power in the region, and this was the cause of geopolitics. Dear readers, do you think Russia attacked Ukraine without love? You won’t believe it, geopolitics again! In order for mighty Russia to survive, it is necessary to include the Ukrainian geopolitical space in it. Therefore, everything with love, even mutual love!!! The influence of geostrategic scenarios developed by think tanks and politicians cannot be underestimated. In many ways, it is the geopolitical mentality that is behind today’s most dangerous crises and tensions in Ukraine, the Middle East, or the South China Sea. Geopolitics serves as a very attractive model, offering a clear and logical structure for international relations, which can be seen as a playing field where the actors are easily identified and the scenarios are understandable. Some argue that geopolitics is a legacy of empire, and of the colonial and Cold War past, when huge parts of the world were clearly divided between great rival powers. But the modern world is more complex because it is more diverse than ever before, contains a huge number of actors, and is governed by the logic of the market. Geopolitics has therefore evolved in sync with global trends, so naturally terms such as geoeconomics, geoculture, boundaries, religions, i.e. civilizations, have been coined, as if there were differences between people. At the same time, although geopolitics may seem appealingly simple in its ability to explain the complexity of international relations, very little serious effort has been made to understand more deeply what lies behind this grand narrative. So do countries need geopolitics at all? In the Soviet Union it was banned, considering it a THE CAUCASUS AND THE WORLD - International Scientific Journal КАВКАЗ И МИР - Международный научный журнал bourgeois pseudoscience, but there was a five-year plan for economic development. In all likelihood, due to the fact that the USSR only planned for 5-7 years and did not look beyond that, it collapsed. The same was true in Germany since May 1945. Geopolitics is a taboo term, since many understand it as a science of legitimization or even pseudoscience and ideology in the service of the aggressive and exterminating National Socialist policy. Both proponents and critics interpreted geopolitics primarily as a doctrine of the policy of great powers, according to which foreign and world policy is aimed at creating spheres of influence or even establishing world domination. In this regard, war, along with diplomacy, economics and education of the masses, was inevitably part of the worldview and ideology that met a certain political goal. The National Socialist policy pursued the goal of establishing a political “new order in Europe”, which implied the creation of a Greater German, German Reich, in which the “living space” of the “Aryan race” was to extend, first of all, to the territory of Central and Eastern Europe up to the Urals. To achieve this goal, the Slavic peoples were to be significantly reduced in number, and the Jews were to be completely exterminated. Therefore, many Germans find it strange that it was in Russia after 1991 that the word “geopolitics” entered the everyday lexicon of many experts. In principle, this is not surprising, since what was banned in Germany was started by the new Russia, but of course not with the grandiose goal that Germany had, well, at worst they will at least return the space that was under the USSR, for this the Russian “national-fascist” elite of the Kremlin occupied 20% of the territory of Georgia, but foolishly recognized them as independent states. They have fooled the world with bad propaganda that Ossetians in Georgia should be independent, but for some reason not at home. Also geopolitics, but stupid, if not for these atrocities of Moscow, then Russia would not have a better neighbor than Georgia.
Armenia and Azerbaijan in a geopolitical battle. Zangezur corridor
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of three independent states on the map of the South Caucasus was welcomed in Turkey and Iran, which had actually lost the fight for control of the region to Russia in the past. The new geopolitical situation is in their interests, as buffer states have emerged between them and their centuries-old northern rival. Tehran is also using the newly formed situation to its advantage. It has gained the opportunity to communicate with Europe through the South Caucasus, which can significantly reduce its dependence on cooperation in the field of transport with Ankara. One of Tehran's goals is to prevent Ankara from gaining strength in the region, which is beneficial for Russia, as it creates an opportunity to restore control over the region. On the other hand, if there is a prospect of creating a military-political union of the CIS countries led by Moscow, Iran can be safely listed as an opponent of such a union, as it will be perceived as a threat to its own national security. But, as such a union is not expected in the near future, then Iran can be perceived as a Russian ally in the fight against the spread of Turkish and US influence in the region. In addition to neighbors, European countries and the United States are interested in the region. European countries prefer to act with the help of EU programs, which allows them to achieve better results at lower costs. It must be recognized that the South Caucasus is not a priority area in EU policy, so instead of large-scale investments from European companies, there is mainly technical assistance and educational programs, the main goal of which is to find internal resources in the countries of the region, optimize their use. The main political goals of the EU must be recognized as maintaining the independence of the South Caucasus states, primarily from Moscow, as well as stabilizing the situation in them. However, the main goal of the EU in the region is to develop the hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian Sea and ensure their safe transportation to European markets. The United States of America, remaining the only superpower in the world, is striving to support the independence of the former post-Soviet republics from Russia in order to prevent the possibility of their integration around it. The existence of the Caspian hydrocarbon basin contributed to the change in the US position towards the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The US oil giants could not allow either Russian control over the oil fields or the dominance of European competitors. They forced Washington to take an active position in the region and declare it a zone of its vital interests. This is due to the fact that the US dependence on oil supplies from the Persian Gulf countries is great and threatens to exceed the fifty percent threshold. In addition, control over the Caspian basin fields will allow influencing the world oil market. So, as for the EU, it is necessary to recognize the main goals of the US as control over oil and gas reserves in the Caspian region and the creation of routes for transporting oil to the world market. In such international relations and in the process of geopolitical struggle, the peoples and states of the South Caucasus have to live, while simultaneously fighting to preserve their geopolitical space. Today, logistical geopolitics in international relations is at the zenith of its struggle. Conflicts and geopolitical processes affect not only the transport architecture of the South Caucasus states, but also determine which geopolitical camp a particular country will be in. The South Caucasus, with its great transit potential, stands out for its uneven development of the transport infrastructures of all three republics in the region, which is mainly due to a complex of geopolitical problems, in particular the presence of a number of unresolved conflicts. The latter create significant obstacles both for regional transport integration and for the uniform involvement of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan in international transport communications.
RESULTS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND THE «PRO-EUROPEAN» REFERENDUM IN MOLDOVA: WHAT’S NEXT?
The presidential elections on October 20 and November 3, 2024 and the referendum on amendments to the Constitution of Moldova, which should guarantee the immutability of the pro-European course of our country, turned out to be closely linked to each other. Gradually losing the former support of voters in the country, the current President M. Sandu, having set herself the task of being re-elected for a second term, on the advice of the «curator» of the Moldovan right, the German M. Sieg, decided to hold a referendum on amending the Constitution on the same day as the presidential elections, in order to guarantee the European course of our country in the future, and at the same time to strengthen her own political position as a living symbol of the European course. However, the results of the elections and referendum caused disappointment in the camp of the ruling party in Moldova, PAS, and in M. Sandu herself, showing that her previous popular support is now a thing of the past. The changes to the Constitution were supported by a very small majority of votes, only 50.35% of the votes. In the presidential elections, also completely unexpectedly for herself personally, but not for analysts, M. Sandu initially lost to her opponent, supported by the Kremlin and the pro-Russian party of socialists - the former Prosecutor General of Moldova A. Stoianoglo, and only thanks to the votes of the Moldovan diaspora abroad, she managed to win a more or less obvious victory, receiving 55.35% of the votes in the second round. But on the territory of Moldova itself, Sandu lost to her opponent, having secured the support of only 48.81% of the votes, and A. Stoianoglo - 51.19%. Sandu almost never analyzes the reasons for this actual defeat and tries not to mention them, with the exception of her recognition of the failure of her main reform - the justice reform, which was supposed to make this sector more efficient and contribute to increasing the people’s trust in her government. In practice, Sandu only achieved that she replaced the previous composition of the judiciary mainly with her supporters, but at the same time she was unable to increase its efficiency and non-corruption, rather the opposite. Not a single criminal scam from past years was investigated and none of the perpetrators of such went to prison, although back in June 2019, the Minister of Economy THE CAUCASUS AND THE WORLD - International Scientific Journal КАВКАЗ И МИР - Международный научный журнал in the then government of M. Sandu, V. Brynzan, assured that he had discovered «hundreds» of such schemes. Not a single one has been made public and no one has been held accountable for complicity in them under the law. M. Sandu’s sweeping promises to «put the thieves in jail» have come to nothing. NOT A SINGLE participant in the theft of a billion, in which representatives of three political parties (LDPM, DPM and LP) were involved at the time, has been brought to justice. Even the most scandalous figure in the current government, the «grey cardinal» of the PAS, now the Minister of Infrastructure A. Spinu, despite the discontent of many right-wing and even Western embassies accredited in Chisinau, despite everything, continues to hold his post, actively and publicly supported by M. Sandu, who is desperately trying to keep quiet and hide the abuses he committed (she did this even on TV shows). Worse, in addition to the old ones, new criminal schemes have appeared. It is precisely because of them that Western investors are leaving Moldova - in particular, the Japanese Fujikura and the German Koroplast. It is thanks to them that new corruption scandals are happening in the country – like, for example, during the construction of the Leova-Bumbata road, where up to 9 million euros were stolen in just one deal. Huge sums were stolen as a result of the signing of the “gas deal” by then Deputy Prime Minister A. Spinu and Gazprom CEO A. Miller, when the country’s residents had to overpay enormously for the huge volume of gas they had purchased at the time for over 2 years, although the price for it on European markets was 1.5-2 times lower than the Russian one. It is also quite clear what will happen in Moldova if the government in Moldova turns into a coalition government, in which pro-Russian forces can be represented in it in one way or another. This will mean a certain warming in relations with Moscow. This is exactly what happened back in 2019-2020, when the parties that declared themselves pro-Western, including the PDS, were in coalition with the Socialists. There is no doubt that things will be different now. Moreover, even today the PDS has many hidden supporters of the Kremlin who seek to avoid serious conflicts with them or see nothing wrong with concluding large contracts with Russian businesses (or turn a blind eye to the ties between Moldovan and Russian businesses, even in the military-industrial complex). All this will cause a gradual increase in Russian-Moldovan trade and the resumption of visits by Russian and Moldovan public figures and politicians. Only the end of the war in Ukraine can seriously influence this process at this stage, since after that Moldova and Ukraine will begin preparing, with the active support of the West, to eliminate the pro- Moscow “last Balkan outpost” - the Transnistrian regime, and this will inevitably cause new serious conflicts between Moldova and Russia. So, a certain turn towards the Kremlin, which will happen in the case of the creation of the PAS/PSRM coalition, will not in any way mean that Moldova will turn into a second Georgia or, even more so, Belarus. The course towards Europe will remain, and even if less loudly than under the current government, it will continue even in this case. It will receive support from the West and thanks to this, Moldova will come to our main goal of the next decade – joining the European Union, and with it NATO.
On the history of the formation of the system in international relations
The system of international relations has its own history, so until the middle of the 17th century, international relations were characterized by the disunity of their participants, the lack of system of international interactions, the main manifestation of which were short-term armed conflicts or long wars. At different periods, the historical hegemons in the world were Ancient Egypt, the Persian Empire, the Empire of Alexander the Great, the Roman Empire, the Byzantine Empire, the Empire of Charlemagne, the Mongol Empire of Genghis Khan, the Ottoman Empire, the Holy Roman Empire, etc. All of them were focused on establishing their sole domination, building a unipolar world. In the Middle Ages, the Catholic Church, headed by the papal throne, tried to establish its domination over peoples and states. International relations were anarchic in nature and were characterized by great uncertainty. As a result, each participant in international relations was forced to take steps based on the unpredictability of the behavior of other participants, which led to open conflicts. It is precisely the consideration of these issues that is the goal of this article.