

**THE PLACE OF SOUTH AZERBAIJAN IN THE GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS OF
THE GREAT POWERS
(DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR)**

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ABSTRACT. *The article talks about the internal situation in Iran, especially in South Azerbaijan, on the eve of the Second World War, and the region's important place in the sphere of interest of the great powers. The factors determining the interests of the USSR, which is trying to make the north of Iran its own, as well as the interests of great powers such as England, the United States, and Germany, in this area have been explained.*

In order to gain political legitimacy, the state-building of the Pahlavis, who declared their monarchy as the successor of the old Persian Empire, was based on two main principles: creating a single central authority, ensuring national unity and unity. The ideology of national unity served to justify the rapid and comprehensive assimilation of non-Persians, primarily Azerbaijanis, living in Iran in terms of language and culture. In fact, Reza Shah's policy of Persianization did not ensure the melting of non-Persian peoples from a political point of view, on the contrary, it caused them to move away from the center and increase their national consciousness. In the research, although the Soviets' aggressive and aggressive policy against Iran was important for the establishment of the National Government, the existence of a very strong Azerbaijani National Movement within Iran is also proven on the basis of facts.

Keywords: *South Azerbaijan, Iran, great powers, Second World War, aggressive policy*

INTRODUCTION

Due to its geostrategic position, rich natural resources (oil, etc.), as well as other factors, Azerbaijan has been in the sphere of interest of the powerful states of the time throughout history and has become one of the main arenas of military-diplomatic conflicts of those powers. Azerbaijan was the center of attention of the leading actors of world politics in the beginning, middle and end of the 20th century. The multifaceted interests and policies of those international powers (Russia, England, USA, etc.) played a special role in the "inevitable" failures of the national-democratic movements that took place in the 20th century in South Azerbaijan, which is considered the main support and center of the struggle against the Iranian regime.

Even today, the solution of the "Iranian problem" has been put forward in the modern Middle East policy of the states aiming to acquire the status of an unequivocal authority in the Caucasus and the Middle East. This causes the issue of South Azerbaijan to come up.

Currently, the development of political processes shows that if in the 1940s the importance of South Azerbaijan in the system of international relations was mainly related to the "oil factor", today the geostrategic position of South Azerbaijan is prominent in the policy of the leading states regarding Iran. (Regarding the East-West, North-South transport corridor)

On the eve of the Second World War, the internal situation in Iran, especially in South Azerbaijan, and the factors that determined the region to occupy an important place in the

interest of leading actors.

Starting from 1918, a wide moral and ideological activity on the methods of strengthening the independence of the state was started in Iran, and a number of practical steps were taken. Intellectuals educated in Europe and working mainly there fought for the restoration of ancient Iranian traditions of statehood and the appropriation of European political values. This issue became even more urgent after the 1921 coup, most of the supporters of modernization saw the basis of independence and development in the establishment of a strong central government in the country and its leadership in nation-state building. At the end of 1925, as a result of the coup d'état, the Qajars were removed from the throne and Reza Khan was declared the king, and a new phase of reforms and modernization began in the geography of Iran. The new state-building was based on two principles: creating a single central government, ensuring national unity and unity. The policy of centralization was carried out by military means. The creation of national unity had to be ensured through the unification of legal, judicial and educational systems in the country. Ensuring the principle of national unity was supposed to take place on the basis of the integration of the Iranian peoples, which should take place due to the assimilation and Persianization of non-Persians. That process began to be carried out artificially and with uncivilized, violent methods. The ideology of national unity served to justify the rapid and comprehensive assimilation of non-Persians, primarily Azerbaijanis, living in Iran in terms of language and culture. According to the ideologues of national unity, it would not be possible to ensure the independence of Iran unless all the non-Persian peoples of Iran were linguistically and culturally assimilated, and a single Iranian nation, in fact, the Persian nation, was formed. In order to gain political legitimacy, the Pahlavis declared their monarchy as the successor of the old Persian Empire. In fact, Reza Shah's Persianization policy ensured that Azerbaijanis and Kurds claimed their national identity. This attempt of his did not ensure the melting of non-Persian peoples from a political point of view, on the contrary, it caused them to move away from the center and increase their national consciousness. This discrimination led to the beginning of a period that would lead to Iran's disintegration and state instability.

The Soviet Union's border with Iran increased its interest in the north of this country - South Azerbaijan. On the eve of World War II, there were two main factors determining the interests of the USSR in Iran. One of them was the geopolitical factor, more precisely, the "Southern Azerbaijan issue". After the annexation of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, as well as the Baltic republics by the Soviets, the interest and attention of the USSR leadership to South Azerbaijan increased significantly. There were some specific reasons for this: 1) The geostrategic importance of South Azerbaijan, to be more precise, the passage of various roads leading to the Persian Gulf, India, and the Far East was of great importance; 2) The Soviet leadership was not immune to Iran's political, economic, as well as military cooperation with Fascist Germany and the imminent threat from there; 3) In the first years of the First World War, the fact that the German-Turkish group captured Tabriz and posed a threat to Russia was not erased from the memory of the leadership of the USSR, which was considered the heir and successor of the Tsarist Empire; 4) It was an event of the recent past that the representative of Iran made a speech against Russia at the Paris Peace Conference. Both this and the events mentioned in the previous paragraph were serious historical lessons for the establishment of the Soviet empire [Həsənli, 1998; p.35].

Another factor determining Soviet interests in Iran was economic interests - the oil factor. Since the beginning of the Second World War, the capture of the oil and gas reserves in the north of this country was perhaps the first of the leading lines in the USSR's plans for Iran.

Towards the end of the 30s of the 20th century, the aggressive intentions of fascist Germany, which prepared the plan to create a "millennium Reich that will cover the whole world", also targeted South Azerbaijan. South Azerbaijan was planned to be included in the "Greater Turkestan" to be included in the Reich.

At the end of the 1930s, the authority of Reza Shah began to weaken considerably, and political activity in the country increased. Some authors (British diplomats in the country) attribute this to "Reza Pahlavi's extreme nationalism and hostile attitude towards foreigners"

[Azadeh, 1987; p.103]. The processes taking place in the international world also affected this issue. On the eve of the Second World War, Iran's rapprochement with Germany later led to the country becoming a fascist anti-Soviet arena. One of the main reasons for such consolidation of the Germans in Iran should be sought in the authoritarian way of governance existing in the country. Reza Shah, who was at the head of a monarchical regime based on authoritarian rule, tried to use the fact of Germany's strengthening in Iran to protect his power. In 1935, when Reza Shah received German ambassador Vipert Blucher in Tehran, he said that authoritarianism is the best way of governing to prevent people from turning to communism [Агаев, 1971; p.277].

According to the information obtained by the Soviet intelligence officers, German soldiers were "resting" in the tourist towns located on the shores of the Caspian Sea in Iran.

The Soviet leadership, trying to "own" the north of Iran (Southern Azerbaijan), considering the increase of fascist activity in this country as a threat to the southern borders, presented warning notes to the Iranian government on June 26, July 19, and August 16, 1941 [Thomas, Frye, 1971; p.229]. Following this, the leadership of the USSR, citing the fact that fascist spies held important positions in many government offices of Iran, guided by paragraph 6 of the Soviet-Iranian agreement dated February 26, 1921, on August 25, 1941, sent its troops to the north of the country - to the historical lands of South Azerbaijan [Милов, 1953; p.4]. Soon after the Soviet troops entered Iran, it became clear that these steps of the Soviet government were part of a very carefully and detailed strategic plan. The issue of integration of the Azerbaijani lands divided by the partition of Iran came into focus.

Following the entry of Soviet military units into Iran, British troops also entered there. Thus, the Pahlavi regime's close cooperation with Germany gave world-scale powers such as the USSR and Great Britain a reason to realize their interests in Iran, and as a result, Iran's territory became a "playground" of international actors. This was facilitated by the intervention of the troops of the two countries in Iran. It should be noted that Iran's natural resources and geopolitical position were in the interest of other world powers such as the USSR - Great Britain and the United States.

It is very interesting that the proposal for Soviet and British troops to enter Iran came for the first time from the leadership of Great Britain on July 11, 1941. Thus, Prime Minister Winston Churchill's military adviser, Lord Wavell, proposed a "classic colonial solution" for the allies to help each other through the territory of Iran. Churchill believed that the war would weaken the Soviet Union and make it dependent on Britain and the United States [Бережков, 1975; p.5]. On January 29, 1942, the Treaty of Alliance between the USSR, Iran and Great Britain was signed in Tehran. With this agreement, the occupation of Iran by the USSR and Great Britain was given a legal status. It should be noted that this agreement would become the main source of reference in all official and diplomatic meetings regarding Iran.

In December 1941, the troops of the United States also entered Iran. Immediately after Iran was declared eligible for US Lend-Lease aid in March 1942, the Iranian government appealed to United States officials to reorganize and strengthen the army and gendarmerie [Алиев, 1985]. It should be noted that the United States did not support the idea of the intervention of allied (Soviet and British) troops in Iran and tried as much as possible to prevent this plan from happening. Later, the US government had to support the decision of the Soviet and British governments to send troops to Iran.

After the deployment of Soviet and British, and then American, troops to Iran, Germany's interests in this country gradually began to weaken. The main reason for this was that the allies took control of all the structures of Iran.

The entry of allied troops into Iran led to the resignation of the government and the abdication of Reza Shah in favor of Crown Prince Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (16.09.1941).

With the departure of Reza Shah Pahlavi from power and the weakening of the authority of the center, the left-oriented forces became more active, democratic circles started legal activities. The role of the USSR, especially North Azerbaijan, was great in the formation and development of the liberation movement of South Azerbaijanis on the national level. The entry of foreign troops into Iran in 1941 and the weakening of the central government's control over the regions

created conditions for the Soviet Union to increase its political influence in this area and for the implementation of this political project, a group responsible for special ideological propaganda and agitation work was sent to Tabriz under the name of assistance to national-cultural and political revival in South Azerbaijan at the initiative of M.C. Bagirov. Soon, "Vatan Yolunda" and "Gizil Asgar" newspapers began to be published. "Vatan Yolunda" newspaper had subscribers in all cities of South Azerbaijan and also readers in other areas of Iran where Azerbaijanis live compactly. "On the Homeland" had a circulation several times higher than that of most Iranian newspapers, i.e. 15,000 copies [Vakilov, 1991; p.47]. The "Council of Poets" organized under the newspaper gathered more than 50 poets of South Azerbaijan and closely helped them in their creativity.

The rapid failure of the Soviet Union on the front pushed the issue of Azerbaijan's unification into the background. After the tripartite agreement signed on January 29, 1942, which included the territorial integrity of Iran, the Azerbaijani mission sent to Iran was recalled in March-May 1942.

As the situation on the German-Soviet front gradually changed in favor of the Russians, Moscow returned to the issue of South Azerbaijan in 1944 and sent a new working group from Soviet Azerbaijan to Iran. In the spring of 1944, more than 20 people working in the state offices of Soviet Azerbaijan were sent to Iran for diplomatic work. They were appointed vice-consuls in Tabriz, consuls in Maku, Ahar, Urmia, Anzali and other cities. The desire of Azerbaijanis to unite coincided with the policy of expanding the territory of the Soviet Union. A favorable environment for the activity of national-democratic circles was also created in South Azerbaijan. The activity of the closed publications was restored again. Such periodicals as "Shahin", "Vatan Yolu" (Tabriz), "Gizil Asgar" (Urmiya), "Azerbaijan", "Sitareye Azerbaijan", "Xavare no", "Yumruq" and so on began to operate. During these years, the periodicals, especially the "Azerbaijan" newspaper, fought ideologically in the direction of ensuring the national interests of the people. The "Soviet culture house" in Tabriz, the "Soviet-Iranian Cultural Communication Society Tabriz branch" had a great role in the creation and development of the democratic press and literature in Azerbaijan's native language [Vakilov, 1991; p.64-65-67].

In total, from October 1941 to September 1945, 21 newspapers were published in Azerbaijan for 4 years. The topics published in these periodicals were aimed at promoting the Soviet socialist ideology and educating the local population. In order to educate the public, articles were published in those publications that included the culture of Azerbaijan, the literary figures of Azerbaijan in the classical and contemporary period, the history of language and literature, the tragedy of the nation divided into two, as well as examples of world literature. The Azerbaijani-language press of this period almost accelerated this process by publishing materials with socio-political, national-cultural content, which are important for the deepening of national consciousness. These mass media reflected the determination of broad democratic forces to fight for the equality of the mother tongue and tried to unite intellectual circles in this struggle.

It should be noted that at that time, the movement did not demand independence, but autonomy within Iran. In "Azerbaijan" newspaper (in 1941-42) a special place was given to the promotion of the idea of autonomy. In the demonstration organized by the communists in 1944, the right to autonomy and the unique language of the Azerbaijani nation were openly mentioned [Bosnalı, 2007; p.82]. In fact, this movement was born from the language issue. As the issue of mother tongue is one of the important problems of Azerbaijan and has a strong influence on Persian-Azerbaijani and central-Azerbaijani relations in those conditions, the issue of ensuring the rights of the mother tongue came to the fore. According to the democrats' belief, the solution of that issue ensured not only the solution of the national issue, but also the integrity of the Iranian state ["Azərbaycan" (Təbriz), 03.12.1941].

The entry of Soviet troops into Iran and the activity of a special group sent from the Azerbaijan SSR played an important role in raising the issue of independence. Let's draw attention to one of the letters of the head of the Azerbaijan SSR Mirjafar Bagirov to Stalin: "The population of South Azerbaijan, in particular, taking into account the strong influence of the clergy among the villagers, a number of measures were implemented in this direction. The anti-

fascist appeal to all Muslims accepted at the Congress of Transcaucasian clergy and faithful Muslims recently held in Baku was sent by us to Iran and distributed among the population in 5000 copies in Azerbaijani and Persian languages. Iranian clergy and people welcomed this appeal with great enthusiasm. In addition, the newly elected religious administration of Muslims of Transcaucasia under the leadership of SheikhuIslam Alizade establishes personal relations with the religious leaders of South Azerbaijan in order to further strengthen our influence [Məmmədov, 2006; p.30]. During the visit of the Caucasian Sheikhu-Islam Akhund agha Alizade to Iran in May 1945, his religious speeches in Turkish in many mosques had a certain influence on the development of the national thought of the southern Azerbaijanis [Bosnali, 2007; p.81]. As it can be seen, Soviet Azerbaijan's all-encompassing propaganda played a serious role in the national awakening of Iranian Azerbaijanis and actualized the ideas of independence. Researcher Sonel Bosnali also shows that it was as a result of these influences that demands for independence began to be voiced in the mentioned period. However, in the propaganda for the secession of Azerbaijan, the ideas of Turkism were hardly raised. We think it was due to the influence from the North. It is clear that since the mid-1930s, Turkicism was banned in the USSR as a rival-nationalist ideology to communism, and the bearers of these ideas were subjected to repressions. Stalin's decision to abolish the "Turkish" identity was related to the fear of Turkey, and the bearers of this idea were branded as "agents of Turkey". It is possible that the USSR feared that the resurgence of this ideological line would lead to a paradigm shift, and that it could facilitate the introduction of the Turkish factor in Iran. The Soviet Empire, which was in conflict with countries such as the United States and Great Britain, did not need an additional opponent in the field it considered as one of the zones of vital interest.

At the end of 1946, some Azerbaijani circles serving the Pahlavi policy suppressed the national-liberation and democratic movement of Azerbaijanis with the help of foreign countries and the force of arms. Considering the movement of 1945 as a product of the USSR's policy of "socialism expansion to the East", the British government tried to support the Iranian government as much as possible in the fight against this movement. Thus, on November 28, 1945, British Ambassador to Iran Reeder Bullard, in a meeting with Iranian Prime Minister Hakimi, advised him to give the world press and the allied governments extensive and complete information about Azerbaijan province and how Russians are connected to this province. At that meeting, the British ambassador warned Hakimi that today (November 28), Iran's ambassador to England, Taghizadeh, will publish a note addressed to the Soviet embassy on behalf of his government in the London press, requesting the release of troops to the north [İsmayılov, 2010; p.18]. Indeed, on the same day, the Iranian embassy in England issued its declaration to the countries of the world. On March 7, 1946, Prime Minister William Churchill threatened the USSR with atomic weapons at an event attended by the US president at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri [Протопов, 2001; p. 288]. In that speech, Churchill proposed that an alliance of English-speaking countries, primarily the United States and Great Britain, should be formed against communist colonialism. He said: "From Stettin on the coast of the Baltic Sea to Trieste on the coast of the Adriatic Sea, an iron curtain is covered over the European continent" [Həsənli, 1999; p.140].

The United States, which joined the international struggle centered on Iran, including South Azerbaijan, a little late due to certain objective reasons, benefited from the fragmentation of the Iranian policy of the USSR. Against the background of I.Stalin's February 9 statement that he "challenged the world", the USA replaced its ambassador in Moscow, A. Harriman, who was in favor of cooperation with the USSR, with Walter Smith as the first step. Following this, the main lines of the US policy towards the Soviets and communism as a whole were developed. The work of George Kennan should be specially emphasized in this work. In the second decade of February, the political conditions in the international world entered a new stage with the "long telegram" sent by Kennan, the secretary of the US Embassy in Moscow, to Washington on February 22. Kennan's telegram had a strong influence on the determination of US policy for the post-war period [Həsənli, 1999; p.112-113]. He proposed to prevent Soviet expansion, influence and expansion by either military or political means. Kennan wrote: "In the field of foreign policy,

we should look at the Soviet Union not as a partner, but as an opponent. Soviet power is incapable of logical action, but it is very sensitive to the logic of power. It is necessary to force the USSR to retreat, it is necessary to talk with it from a position of strength" [Həsənli, 1999; p.112-113].

The Iranian leadership saw the only way out in order to prevent the expansion of the autonomy movement in South Azerbaijan and its spread to other provinces of the country in finding a language with the Soviet Union. For this purpose, the return to power of Ahmed Gavam, who was supported by every member of the "Big Three" and could normalize relations with the Soviet Union, was implemented.

Considering the "solution" of the Azerbaijan issue as his first duty and duty, Gavam held negotiations with the leadership of the USSR from February 19 to March 7, 1946 for this purpose. During these negotiations, the main discussions revolved around the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Iran, the solution of the South Azerbaijan problem, and the creation of a joint Soviet-Iranian society for the purpose of discovering and exploiting the oil fields in the north of Iran.

The documents of that time provide a reason to justify the fact that the Azerbaijan issue is a matter of great interstate relations. At that time, the American secretary of state wrote to the ambassador in Iran to meet with the Iranian prime minister and make him understand that the Azerbaijanis will be right if the language and cultural rights of the Azerbaijanis are not granted and this issue is brought up for international discussion.

On March 18, 1946, at the insistence of the US Secretary of State J. Byrnes and the British Foreign Minister E. Bevy, the Iranian ambassador to the United States, Hossein Ala, made a corresponding appeal to the UN Secretary General Trughve Lee [Thomas, Frye, 1971; p.238]. The appeal of Iran's ambassador to the United States to the UN Security Council on behalf of his country was a victory for the United States and England, according to Byrnes and Bevy. In that appeal, the Iranian government requested that the Azerbaijan issue be included in the agenda of the Security Council meeting in accordance with Article 35, Paragraph 1 of the UN Charter, and that the text of this appeal be sent to the members of the Security Council. On March 24, Joseph Stalin, the Supreme Commander of the USSR Armed Forces, who could not stand the pressure of the United States and England, signed order No. 160006 on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Iran. On the same day, Sadchikov, the ambassador of the USSR to Iran, sent a reply letter to Prime Minister Ghavam al-Saltana: "The USSR government agrees to the establishment of a joint Soviet-Iranian society on the basis of the conditions indicated in your letter". After that, on April 5, a written agreement was reached between Gavam and Sadchikov under the following conditions:

- a) troops were withdrawn from all of Iran within a month and a half;
- b) the establishment of a joint Iranian-Soviet oil company had to be approved by the Majlis for a period of seven months;
- c) Since the "Azerbaijan issue" belongs to Iran's internal affairs, it should be resolved peacefully between the government and the population of "Southern Azerbaijan" [İsmayılov, 2010; p.18].

On April 8, 1946, Ahmad Qavvam sent a letter of gratitude to the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers I. Stalin and the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs V. Molotov for their services in the "successful" conclusion of the negotiations. The same step was taken the next day by the leaders of both the Soviet governments mentioned above.

Thus, the leadership of the Soviet Union considered the establishment of the Soviet-Iranian Joint Society under any conditions as "booty" and agreed to withdraw its troops from South Azerbaijan. Let's go a little further and note that I. Stalin, who once wished success to the National Government of Azerbaijan in its activities, on the eve of the end of the withdrawal of troops - on May 8, in his personal letter sent to the leader of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan S.C. Peshavari, admitted for the first time and openly expressed his weakness in front of the United States and England: "Of course, if the Soviet troops continue to stay in Iran, you could

hope to succeed in the struggle for the revolutionary demands of the Azerbaijani people. But we can no longer keep them in Iran. Mainly because the presence of Soviet troops in Iran undermines the foundations of our rescue policy in Europe and Asia. The British and Americans tell us that if Soviet troops can stay in Iran, why can't British troops stay in Egypt, Syria, Indonesia, and Greece, and American troops in China, Iceland, and Denmark.." [Rəhimli, 2003; p.178-179].

It should be noted that before the fate of the movement in Azerbaijan was decided, the head of the National Government S.C. Peshavari went to sign the June 13 agreement as a last resort to solve the national issue, mainly the Azerbaijani language problem. An agreement was signed on June 13, 1946 as a result of long meetings held between Peshawar and Central government representative Muzaffar Firuz [Rəhimli, 2009; p.154]. The Peshawar government was able to include some of its language demands in Articles 12 and 13 of this 15-article agreement. In Article 12, Persian and Azerbaijani languages were accepted as the official languages of the region, and two languages were to be taught in primary and secondary schools. According to the requirement of the 13th article, the local government had to ensure that the Kurds, armenians and assyrians living in Azerbaijan could be educated in their mother tongue until the end of the fifth grade. This agreement, supported by the leftists and criticized by the center-right and nationalists, remained in force only until the period (December 13) when the central government army entered Tabriz and ended the existence of the democratic movement.

S.C. Peshawari, who understood the strategic goals of the internal reaction and their foreign patrons, knew in advance that this freedom could not last long without the support of major powers. On December 29, 1945, in a conversation with the US consulate in Tabriz, Robert Rosso, Peshawari touched on this point and stated: "The people of Azerbaijan want real guarantees for their legitimate demands, which can consist of the assistance and protection of all democratic states, including the American government" [Rəhimli, 2009; p.135].

Some Western authors write that the necessary national struggle for the establishment of a National Government does not exist, and that this is possible only as a result of foreign intervention [Cottam, 1967]. However, Russian authors, on the contrary, note that the autonomous republic has demonstrated a high level of national consciousness on the one hand, and the possibility of solving major national issues under the conditions of a democratic regime on the other hand [Иванов, 1970; p.89-112]. At the same time, as S. E. Cornell said, although the aggressive and aggressive policy of the Soviets against Iran is important for the establishment of the National Government, it is impossible to establish such an institution without the development of a very strong Azerbaijani National Movement within Iran [Cornell, 2012; p.310].

Of course, if the processes of national self-awareness did not take place internally, so many things would not have been done in a short period of time with external influence, and the struggle would not have been continued after the overthrow of the National Government. The South Azerbaijan National Liberation Movement of 1945-1946 demonstrated the progress of national development of South Azerbaijanis under pressure in Iran and the degree of ethnic identity, which is the main aspect of national formation.

CONCLUSION

A new movement was formed in South Azerbaijan as a result of raising the status and prestige of the Azerbaijani Turkish language and awakening national consciousness under the influence of external factors (The entry of the troops of Great Britain and the USSR, the activities of Iran in the north to realize the idea of the independence of South Azerbaijan in order to expand the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union) and the natural backlash against the assimilation policy implemented by the Reza Shah dictatorship.

The Allies understood the essence of the policy of the USSR in South Azerbaijan and opposed it. The main factor for this was not the reason for the unification of Azerbaijani lands. They did not want to let the Soviet Union get close to the energy-rich Middle East region.

At that time, the access of the Soviet Union to the energy sources of the Middle East was through the issue of "Southern Azerbaijan". Understanding this well, the US-Great Britain alliance opposed the independence movement of South Azerbaijanis, the democratic regime supported by the people, and supported the despotic, monarchist Pahlavi regime. The American

ambassador admitted after the Soviets left Iran: "We blackmailed, the Soviets ran away in fear".

In general, the conflict, tension, and behind-the-scenes games related to the issue of "South Azerbaijan" became more intense at the next stage and became the reasons that led to the start of the cold war.

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